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A CHARACTERIZATION OF HEIGHT-BASED 
EXTENSIONS OF PRINCIPAL FILTRAL 
OPPORTUNITY RANKINGS
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Vannucci, S. (2013). A characterization of height-based extensions of prin-
cipal filtral opportunity rankings. Cuadernos de Economía, 32(61), 803-815.
A parameterized characterization of height-based total extensions of principal fil-
tral opportunity rankings is provided and shown to include, as a special case, a 
version of the well-known Pattanaik-Xu characterization of the cardinality-based 
ranking.
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Se presenta una caracterización parametrizada de las extensiones totales basadas 
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que incluye, como caso especial, una versión de la reconocida caracterización de 
Pattanaik-Xu sobre el ordenamiento basado en la cardinalidad. 
Palabras clave: conjuntos de oportunidad, altura, desigualdad.
JEL: D71, 025.
Vannucci, S. (2013). Une caractérisation des extensions basées sur la hau-
teur des ordonnancements d’opportunités quand s’applique un filtre princi-
pal. Cuadernos de Economía, 32(61), 803-815. 
Est présentée une caractérisation paramétrique des extensions totales, basées sur 
la hauteur, des ordonnancements d’opportunité de filtre principal, et il est démon-
tré que cela inclut, comme cas spécial, une version de la fameuse caractérisation 
de Pattanaik-Xu sur l’ordonnancement basé sur la cardinalité.
Mots-clés : ensembles d’opportunité, hauteur, inégalité.
JEL : D71, 025.
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INTRODUCTION
In the last two decades, a considerable amount of work has been devoted to the 
analysis of opportunity inequality and related issues concerning rankings of oppor-
tunity sets (see e.g. Alcalde-Unzu & Ballester, 2005; Alcalde-Unzu & Ballester, 
2010; Arlegi & Nieto, 1999; Barberà, Bossert & Pattanaik, 2004; Dutta & Sen, 
1996; Herrero, 1997; Herrero, Iturbe-Ormaetxe & Nieto, 1998; Kolm, 2010; Kra-
nich, 1996; Kranich, 1997; Ok, 1997; Ok & Kranich, 1998; Pattanaik & Xu, 1990; 
Pattanaik & Xu, 2000; Savaglio & Vannucci, 2007; Savaglio & Vannucci, 2009; 
Sen, 1991; Xu, 2004, among many others). In particular, Savaglio and Vannucci 
(2007) suggest the introduction of minimal opportunity thresholds, modelling 
them by set-inclusion filtral preorders.
A set-inclusion filtral preorder on a finite set X of basic opportunities amounts 
to the standard set-inclusion partial order as augmented with a minimal opportu-
nity threshold which is induced by an order-filter (to be defined below). Under the 
threshold, opportunity sets are indifferent to each other and to the null opportunity 
set, whereas, over the threshold the set-inclusion partial order is simply replica-
ted. Therefore, the behaviour of a set-inclusion filtral preorder (henceforth SIFP) 
over the threshold is arguably non-controversial, at least in the following sense: if 
over the threshold, plausible preferences on opportunity sets are taken to be mono-
tonic with respect to set-inclusion, SIFPs include their common core. On the other 
hand, since the threshold itself can be chosen in many different ways, SIFPs—
unlike e.g. the cardinality preorder—also accommodate a non-negligible diver-
sity of judgments concerning the most appropriate ranking of opportunity sets. 
Thus, SIFPs can be regarded as a format for opportunity rankings that, building 
upon a common and essentially `objective’ basis, gives some scope to a modicum 
of diversity in judgments, and therefore strikes a balance between any such judg-
ment and the former common basis. Distinct choices of the relevant threshold 
enable an assessment of the extent of opportunity deprivation as seen from diffe-
rent perspectives. Furthermore, SIFPs are amenable to nice and strategy-proof 
aggregation methods including majority voting (see Savaglio & Vannucci, 2012; 
Vannucci, 1999). Therefore, even the threshold of any given SIFP may be possibly 
regarded as the outcome of a fair amalgamation of reliable information on private 
judgments of experts and/or stakeholders concerning the most appropriate choice 
of minimal living standards. Indeed, under a judicious selection of the set of basic 
opportunities, SIFPs arguably embody valuable information that is both reliable 
and comparatively easy to collect. That information can be deployed to assess 
several aspects of extant inequality and its social perception e.g. by majorization 
criteria. The implied assessments of the relevant opportunity distributions in terms 
of inequality and deprivation may in turn help diagnose those critical situations of 
severe inequality and polarization that could strain and erode several key social 
networks, and undermine social cohesion. All in all, carefully constructed SIFPs 
may arguably provide a key source of reliable and comparatively affordable infor-
mation to several public and private agencies.
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However, when it comes to using SIFPs as a key input for the assessment of oppor-
tunity inequality and polarization, one has to reckon with the central role of majo-
rization rankings in the analysis of inequality. Hence, if inequality of opportunity 
profiles is to be assessed relying on a suitable majorization preorder, the very fact 
that a SIFP is, in general, a non-total preorder is undoubtedly a rather fastidious 
inconvenience. Two basic strategies may be devised to escape the foregoing diffi-
culty while sticking to the notion of a majorization preorder, namely a) reformula-
ting (and generalizing) the majorization construct in order to adapt it to the general 
case of arbitrary non-total preorders, or b) extending SIFPs to total preorders in a 
suitably ‘natural’ manner.
Strategy (a) is quite radical a move. Indeed, the main problem here is that majo-
rization—as it is usually conceived—relies on comparisons between suitable 
sequences of pairs of partial numerical sums running over pairs of (a) equally 
sized subpopulations, each of which (b ) forms a maximal chain with respect to 
the ranking of population units as induced by their respective individual endow-
ments. Now, if the underlying preorder in endowment space is partial a typical 
joint effect of requirements (a) and (b) will consist in singling out distinct num-
bers of relevant partial sums at different opportunity profiles. But then, which par-
tial sum of one opportunity profile should be compared to which partial sum of 
another one? It can be shown that, essentially, such a situation demands some spe-
cial principled tactics to cope with pairs of non-isomorphic lattices of order filters 
as defined below. Thus, such an approach runs deep to the very foundations of the 
majorization construct.
By comparison, strategy (b) namely extending SIFPs to total preorders is much 
more conservative. One way to pursue strategy (b) is implicitly proposed and 
explored in Savaglio and Vannucci (2007). It consists in relying on the height 
function of a SIFP in order to extend the latter to a total preorder, resulting in the 
‘higher than’ relation. Now, the height of an element x  counts the size of the lon-
gest strictly ascending chain having x  as its maximum. Does this notion qualify 
as a ‘natural’ extension of the underlying SIFP?
In general, the answer is admittedly bound to be disputable. In fact, the main pro-
blem here is that, generally speaking, SIFPs admit maximal strictly ascending 
chains of different sizes having the same minimum and the same maximum, i.e. 
SIFPs do not satisfy the so called Jordan-Dedekind chain condition, hence are 
not graded i.e do not have any rank function for their elements (see e.g. Barbut & 
Monjardet, 1970, for a general review of the foregoing notions as defined below 
in the text). Thus, reliance on height functions, which provide an instance of rank 
functions in the graded case, but are well-defined anyway, is a second-best choice 
of sorts. However, it turns out that in order to remedy that inconvenience, one 
may select a suitably defined well-behaved class of SIFPs. In the present paper, 
I focus on principal SIFPs, namely on those SIPFs whose threshold consists of 
precisely one minimum living standard (as opposed to a set of several mutua-
lly non-comparable minimal living standards). The reasons for doing so are the 
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following. First, it is shown below that principal SIFPs are indeed graded and their 
height functions do amount to rank functions. This implies that in the principal 
case, heights provide a much more reliable numerical scale to rank the elements 
of a SIFP, than they do in the general case. Therefore, height-based extensions 
are arguably more ‘natural’ and strongly grounded for principal SIFPs than they 
are for general SIFPs. Second, Savaglio and Vannucci (2007) prove that principal 
SIFPs do support an opportunity-profile counterpart to the classic characterization 
theorems of the majorization preorder on real sequences due to Hardy, Littlewood 
and Pólya (1952).
Starting from the foregoing background and motivation, a simple characterization 
of height-based extensions of principal SIFPs is provided below. Our characteri-
zation relies on conditions that use the relevant filter as a fixed parameter. Indeed, 
it is quite clear that over the filtral threshold height-based extensions of principal 
SIFPs behave, essentially, as the cardinality-based preorder. Therefore, one should 
expect that a suitable reformulation of standard characterizations of the cardina-
lity-based preorder would also work for height-based extensions of SIFPs. As a 
matter of fact, we show that SIFPs can indeed be characterized by a suitably adap-
ted version of the axiom set employed by Pattanaik and Xu (1990) to obtain their 
well-known characterization of the cardinality-based preorder. We also show that 
in our setting a version of the Pattanaik-Xu characterization mentioned above is 
essentially recaptured as a special case which arises from a particular choice of the 
relevant filtral parameter. Arguably, that result highlights the significance of the 
cardinality-ranking as a benchmark and a limiting case within the larger family of 
SIFP-rankings, while confirming, at the same time, the remarkable scope and fle-
xibility of SIFPs themselves.
MODEL AND RESULTS
Let ( , )X   be a preset (i.e.   is a preorder, namely a reflexive and transitive 
binary relation on set X ). We shall denote by ([ ] ,[ ] )X
 
  its quotient partially 
ordered set or quotient poset w.r.t. the symmetric component   of  , namely the 
antisymmetric preset on the set [ ]X

 of  -equivalence classes as defined by the 
rule [ ] [ ] [ ]x y
  
  if and only if x y . If in particular   is antisymmetric then 
preset ( , )X   itself is a partially ordered set or poset. A (non-empty) antichain of 
( , )X   is a (non-empty) set Z X  such that for any z z Z1 2,    if z z1 2  then 
z1  and z2  are not  -comparable. For any (non-empty) antichain Z  of a finite 
non-empty preset ( , )X   an order filter of ( , )Z   with basis Z  is the minimal set 
F F Z X= ( )   such that X Z  and for any y z X,   if y F  and z y  then 
z F .
Thus, whenever X  is finite, an order filter F  of preset ( , )X   is uniquely defined by a 
finite set Z Z F= ( )  = ,...,1z zl{ }  such that F x X x z i i li= : = ,...∈{ }  ,for some 1 :
Z  is also denoted as the basis of F .
808 Cuadernos de Economía, 32(61), número especial 2013
In particular, if Z  is a singleton i.e. l = 1  then F  is said to be a principal order 
filter of ( , )X  . It should be remarked that if ( , )X   is a lattice (namely, if   is 
antisymmetric and for any x y Y,   the pair x y,{ }  has both a least upper bound 
w.r.t.  , and a greatest lower bound w.r.t.  , denoted by x y  and x y , res-
pectively) then a principal order fillter of ( , )X   is also  -closed or equivalently 
a latticial filter, namely x y F∧ ∈  whenever both x F  and y F  (it can also 
be shown that the converse also holds for any finite lattice).
A chain of ( , )X   is a subset Y X  which is totally (pre)ordered by   and such 
that for any x y Y,   x y  only if x y= : by definition, the length of chain Y  is 
l Y Y( ) =| | 1 . A chain Y  of ( ,X  )  is maximal if there is no chain U  of ( , )X   
such that X U’  . If ( , )X   has a minimum or bottom element  , one may define 
its height function h( )  : X → ∪ ∞{ }+Z  by declaring the height h x( )( )  of any 
x X   to be the lowest upper bound of the set of the lenghts of all (maximal) 
chains Y  of ( , )X   having x  as their maximum.
A preset ( , )X   is said to satisfy the Jordan-Dedekind chain condition if for any 
x y X, ,  and any pair of maximal chains Y Z,  of ( , )X   having x  as their com-
mon minimum and y  as their common maximum, l Y l Z( ) = ( )  i.e. equivalently 
| |=| |Y Z . Furthermore, a preset ( , )X   is graded if it admits a rank function i.e. 
an integer-valued function r X:  Z  such that for any x y X,  :
i) if x y  then r x r y( ) > ( )  and ii) r x r y( ) = ( ) 1+  whenever x  covers y  i.e. 
x y  and { : } =z X x z y∈ ∅  .
We are now ready to turn to set-inclusion filtral preorders. We shall confine oursel-
ves to a finite set X , and its power set P(X) . For any order filter F  of poset 
( ( ), )P X   the F -generated set-inclusion filtral preorder (SIFP) is the binary rela-
tion F  on P( )X  defined as follows: for all A B X, ( ) P , A BF  if and only if 
A B  or B F .
Let F  be an order filter of ( ( ), )P X   and F the (set-inclusion) filtral preorder 
induced by F .
Then, the F -induced height function hF : P( )X → +Z  is defined as follows: for 
any A X ,
h A max
A A BF
F
F
( ) = | |:C CC
 is a
 and  for any 
 −
∈
chain such that
 B A∈ { }





C \
.
The height-based (total) extension of F  is the total preorder hF defined as follows: for any A B X, ,  A BhF  if and only if h A h BF F( ) ( ) .
As mentioned in the Introduction, the main aim of the present paper is to provide 
a characterization of the height-based total preorder hF  when the relevant order filter F  is principal. Indeed, it turns out that in the latter case the SIFP ( ( ), )P X F  
is graded, hence the height function hF  is a well-defined rank function which pro-
vides an unambiguous criterion to assess the comparative ‘status’ of opportunity 
sets according to F . This claim is made precise by the following
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Proposition 1. Let F  be a principal order filter of ( ( ), )P X  . Then, the F  -gene-
rated SIFP ( ( ), )P X F  is a graded preset. 
Proof. It is a well-known fact that a finite poset—hence indeed any finite preset, 
by definition—is graded if and only if it satisfies the Jordan-Dedekind condition as 
defined above (see e.g. Barbut & Monjardet, 1970, chpt. 1, p. 39). Thus, it suffices 
to show that ( ( ), )P X F  does satisfy the latter condition. Indeed, suppose it does 
not. Then, by definition there exist A B X,   and maximal chains 
C = C{[ ] ,..,[ ] }, = {[ ] ,..,[ ] }0 0C C C CF k F ’ ’ F k’
’
F     of ([ ( )] ,[ ] )P X F F   with 
C Ci F i +1 , i k= 0,., 1 , C Ci
’
F i
’
 +1 , i k
’
= 0,., 1 , [ ] = [ ] = [ ]0 0C C BF ’ F F   , 
[ ] = [ ] = [ ]C C Ak F k’
’
F  , and | | |C | C ’ . Now, if A B=  or { , } =A B F∩ ∅  then by 
construction | | |= 1C |= C’ , a contradiction. Hence, A B  and either 
{ , } = { }A B F A  or { , }A B F  holds. If in fact, { , } = { }A B F A  then B F  
hence, by definition of F  and maximality of chains C,C
’
, it must be the case that 
both C1  and C
’
1  belong to the basis of F  and for any i k∈ −{1,.. 1}
 
,
j k’∈ −{1,.., 1}  there exist x X C y X C’i i j j \ \,  such that C C xi i i= { } , 
C C xj
’
j
’
j+ ∪1 = { }.  But then, since F  is principal, C C’1 1= . It follows that, by cons-
truction, k C C C C’ ’ ’ ’− { } { } −1 =| , |=| , |= 10 1 0 1C C\ \  whence k k’= , a contradic-
tion. Finally, if B F  as well then again, by definition of F   and maximality of 
chains C,C’  it must be the case that for any i k∈ −{0,.. 1} , j k’∈ −{0,.., 1}  
there exist x X C y X Ci i j j
’ \ \,  such that C C xi i i= { } , C C xj’ j’ j+ ∪1 = { }  
whence by the same argument presented above k k’= , a contradiction, and the 
thesis is established.   
Remark.  Of course, a general SIFP need not be graded. To check this fact, consi-
der the following elementary example: let X x y z= { , , } , F  the order filter of 
( ( ), )P X   having {{ },{ , }}x y z  as its basis, and ( ( ), )P X F  the resulting SIFP. 
Then consider C = {[ ] ,[{ , }] ,X x yF F   [{ }] ,[ ] }x F F   and 
C’ F F FX y z= {[ ] ,[{ , }] ,[ ] }   . Notice that C  and C’  are two maximal chains of 
([ ( )] ,[ ] )P X F F F   of different size (and length), having [ ]X F  as their common 
maximum and [ ]
F  as their common minimum. Thus, ( ( ), )P X F  does not 
satisfy the Jordan-Dedekind chain condition and as a consequence -being finite- is 
not graded.
Let us now proceed to the announced characterization of hF . In order to accom-plish that task, a few more definitions are needed.
Let F  be any (non-empty) principal order filter of the (finite) poset ( ( ), )P X  , 
i.e. equivalently a (non-empty) latticial filter of the (finite) lattice ( ( ), , )P X ∪∩ . 
Then, for an arbitrary binary relation   on P( )X  (with asymmetric and symme-
tric components denoted as usual by   and  , respectively) the following F
-parameterized properties can be defined:
F-Restricted Indifference between Singletons (F-RIS):
( ( ), )P X   satisfies F-RIS if for all A F  and x y X A,  \ , A x A y { } { } .
F-Restricted Strict Monotonicity (F-RSM):
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( ( ), )P X   satisfies F-RSM if for all A F  and x y X,   such that x y , y A  
entails A x y A x { , } { } .
F-Restricted Independence (F-RIND):
( ( ), )P X   satisfies F-RIND if for all A B F,   and x X , x A B∉ ∪  and 
A B  if and only if A x B x { } { } .
F-Threshold Effect (F-TE):
( ( ), )P X   satisfies F-TE if A B   for all A B X,   such that ∅≠ ∈A F  
and B X F P( ) \ .
It turns out that, in general, the foregoing properties are not mutually independent. 
Indeed, we have the following:
Proposition 2. Let F  be a principal filter of ( ( ), )P X   and ( ( ), )P X   a preset 
which satisfies both F-RIS and F-RSM. Then ( ( ), )P X   satisfies F-RIND as well. 
Proof. Let us assume that A B F x X A B, , ( )∈ ∈ ∪\ . Since, by definition of F , 
there exists Y X  such that F C X C Y= { : }⊆ ⊇ , it follows that there also exist 
non-negative integers h k,  and { ,.., }1a a X Yh  \ , { ,.., }1b b X Yk  \  such that 
A Y a ah= { ,.., }1 , B Y b bk= { ,.., }1 .
Now, suppose A B . If h k<  then A Y b bh { ,.., }1  by a repeated application 
of F-RIS. Therefore, by a repeated application of F-RSM, B   Y b bh{ ,.., }1  
 A  whence, by transitivity of  , B A , a contradiction. Let us then assume 
without loss of generality that h k . Thus, by a repeated application of F-RIS to 
Y x{ } ,  Y a a x Y b b xk k { ,.., , } { ,.., , }1 1 . If h k= , then A x B x { } { }  
follows immediately. Otherwise, A x Y a a xh { } = { ,.., , }1   Y b bk{ ,.., }1  
follows by a repeated application of F-RSM, and by transitivity of  .
Conversely, let us assume that A x B x { } { } . If A Y a ah= { ,.., }1  
 B Y b bk= { ,.., }1  does not hold, then it must be the case that h k< . But then, 
it follows by a repeated application of F-RIS to Y x F∪ ∈{ }  that 
Y b b x Y a a x A xh h  { ,.., , } { ,.., , } = { }1 1 . Thus, by a repeated application of 
F-RSM and by transitivity of  , it also follows that B x A x { } { } , a contra-
diction. Hence A B , and F-RIND holds.   
We are now in a position to state and prove the main characterization result of the 
present paper.
Theorem 3. Let F  be a principal filter of ( ( ), )P X   and ( ( ), )P X   a preset. 
Then,   is the height-based (total) extension hF  of the set-inclusion principal filtral preorder F  if and only if ( ( ), )P X   satisfies F-RIS, F-RSM and F-TE. 
Proof. It is straightforward to check that ( ( ), )P X hF  is in fact a totally preorde-
red set that satisfy F -RIS, F -SM, and F -TE. Indeed, let F A X A Y= { : }⊆ ⊇  
where Y X . If A F , and x y X,   \F   then by definition 
h A x h A y A YF F( { }) = ( { }) =| | 1∪ ∪ +\  whence A x A yF { } { } . Moreover, 
A F  , x y X,   and y A  clearly entail h A x yF ( { , })  =| | 3A Y\ +  and 
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h A x A YF ( { }) =| | 2∪ +\  if x A , while h A x y A YF ( { , }) =| | 2∪ +\  and 
h A x A YF ( { }) =| | 1∪ +\  if x A : in any case, by definition, A x y A xhF { , } { } . Finally, for all A X F P( ) \  and B F , h A hF F( ) = 0 = ( )  while h BF ( ) 1  
i.e. B AhF hF   .
Conversely, let ( ( ), )P X   be a preset that satisfies F-RIS, F-RSM and F-TE 
(hence in particular F-RIND by Proposition 2. To begin with, we define an auxi-
liary function l XF : ( )P  N  as follows: for any A X , 
l A max A Z Z F Z AF ( ) = {| |: , }\ ∈ ⊆  =| |A Y\ , if A Y  and l AF ( ) = 1  
otherwise (i.e. l AF ( ) =  h AF ( ) 1  : lF  is the so-called length function of 
( ( ), )P X F ).
Next, we show that since ( ( ), )P X   satisfies F-RIS and F-RIND it follows that for 
any A B F, :
l A l BF F( ) = ( )  entails A B  (or equivalently h A h BF F( ) = ( )  entails A B ).
We proceed by induction on l AF ( ) . The case l A l BF F( ) = ( ) = 0  is trivial in that it 
entails - by definition - A Y B= =  whence A B .
Let us now suppose by inductive hypothesis that for any nonnegative integer m  not 
larger than n , l A l B mF F( ) = ( ) =  entails A B . Then, take a pair C D X,   such 
that l C l D nF F( ) = ( ) = 1+ . If C D=  there is nothing to prove. If C D  then there 
exist x y X,   and A B X,   such that A B Y∩ ⊇ , | |=| |A Y B Y\ \  = n , x B , 
y A  and C A x= { } , D B y= { } . It follows that { , } =x y Y∩ ∅  hence, by 
definition, l A l C l D l B nF F F F( ) = ( ) 1 = ( ) 1 = ( ) =  , which entails A B , by the 
inductive hypothesis. Moreover, if x A  then C A= , a contradiction since 
l A l CF F( ) ( ),  thus indeed x A B∉ ∪ , and y A B∉ ∪  by a similar argument. 
Therefore, A x B x { } { }  (and A y B y { } { } ) by F-RIND. Furthermore, 
A x A y { } { }  (and B y B x { } { } ) by F-RIS. As a result, A x B y { } { }  
i.e. C B , by transitivity of  , and the inductive thesis follows.
Now, take any pair A B X,   such that h A h BF F( ) > ( )  or equivalently 
l A l BF F( ) > ( ) . Two cases should be distinguished, namely: i) A Y  and B Y ; 
ii A B Y) ∩ ⊇ . If case 1) obtains, then, by definition of F , A F  and B F  
hence A B   by F-TE. Under case 2) both A F  and B F , and there exist 
A X Y’  \ , B X Y’  \  such that A Y A’=   , B Y B’=   and | |>| |A B’ ’ . Then, 
there also exists A A’’ ’  such that | |=| |A B’’ ’ . We also posit | |=A A k’ ’’\  and 
A A x x’ ’’ k= { ,.., }1 . Therefore, l Y A l Y B l BF ’’ F ’ F( ) = ( ) = ( )   whence 
( )Y A B’’   by the first part of this proof. Since Y A F’’∪ ∈ , it follows from 
F-RSM that Y A x Y A’’ ’’  { }1  . By a repeated application of a similar argu-
ment - and by transitivity of   - we can eventually establish that A Y A B’’    
whence A B .
Thus, we have just shown that for any A B X h A h BF F, : ( ) = ( )  entails A B  
and h A h BF F( ) > ( )  entails A B , i.e. ( ) ( ) hF  . Hence, in particular,   is a 
total preorder. But notice that if there exist A B X,   such that A B  and not 
A BhF , then -since hF is also a total preorder by definition - it must be the case 
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that B AhF  hence h B h AF F( ) ( )  and therefore B A  since ( ) ( ) hF  . Moreover, not A BhF  entails h B h AF F( ) > ( )  and not A B , whence B A , a 
contradiction. It follows that ( ) ( )  hF  as well, so that ( ) = ( ) hF  and our 
thesis is thus established.   
The foregoing characterization is tight. To see this, consider the following list of 
examples.
Example 1.  Take a principal order filter F  of ( ( ), )P X   and the corresponding 
set-inclusion filtral preorder F on P( )X  defined as follows: for any A B X,  , 
A BF   if and only if [A B  B F/ ]  (see Vannucci, 1999; Savaglio & Van-
nucci, 2007). It is easily checked that F  is indeed a preorder, and satisfies F-RSM 
and F-TE. Moreover, let A F B F ,  and x X A B∈ ∪\ ( ) . Thus, A BF  
entails A B  whence A x B x∪ ⊇ ∪{ } { }  which in turn entails A x B xF { } { } . 
Conversely, since obviously { { }, { }}A x B x F∪ ∪ ⊆ , A x B xF { } { }  entails 
A x B x∪ ⊇ ∪{ } { } . Then A B  as well, hence by definition A BF . It follows 
that F  also satisfies F-RIND. However, for any A F  and x y A,   such that 
x y , A x{ }  and A y{ }  are not  F -comparable, hence F-RIS fails.
Example 2.  Let us consider again a principal order filter F  of ( ( ), )P X  , and the 
binary relation F X X
# ( ) ( )∂⊆ ×P P  defined as follows: for any A B X,  , 
A BF
#
 if and only if [either ( ,B F A F   and | | | |)B A  or B F  ]. Notice 
that F
# is indeed a preorder: to check this, first observe that reflexivity of F
#
 
follows trivially from the definition, and assume that A BF
#
  and B CF
#
. The 
following mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive cases should be distinguis-
hed:
1) | | | |,| | | |B A C B   and { , , }A B C F : in this case | | | |C A  hence A CF#  
by the first clause; 2) | | | |,{ , }B A A B F≥ ⊆  and C F : in this case A CF#  by 
the second clause; 3) B F  and C F : here again A CF#  follows immedia-
tely from the second clause. Thus, A CF
#
 is transitive. Also, if A F , x A  
and y A , then clearly A x F∪ ⊆{ } , A y F∪ ⊆{ }}  and | { } |=| { } |A x A y   
whence by definition A x A yF∪ ∪
∂{ } { }#   i.e. F-RIS is satisfied. Similarly, if 
A F , B F , x X A B∈ ∪\ ( )  and A BF#  then | | | |B A  and 
{ { }, }A x B x F∪ ∪{ } ⊆ . Thus, | { } | | { } |B x A x∪ ≥ ∪  whence by definition 
A x B xF∪ ∪
∂{ } { }# . Conversely, if A F , B F , x X A B∈ ∪\ ( )  and 
A x B xF∪ ∪
∂{ } { }#  then, by definition | { } | | { } |B x A x∪ ≥ ∪ : it follows that 
| | | |B A  as well hence by definition A BF# . Therefore, F-RIND is also satis-
fied by ( ( ), )#P X F  . Finally, F-TE follows immediately from the definition. 
However, F-RSM is definitely not satisfied by ( ( ), )#P X F  : indeed, if A F , 
x X A \ , y X A \  and x y   then, by definition, A x A x yF∪ ∪
∂{ } { , }#  hence 
F-RSM is violated.
Example 3. Fix a principal order filter F  of ( ( ), )P X   and take the binary rela-
tion F X X
# ( ) ( )⊆ ×P P  defined as follows: for any A B X,  , A BF#  if and 
only if  either ( A F  ) or ( A F B F ,  and | | | |A B ). It can be readily chec-
ked that F
# is a preorder: to see this, observe that reflexivity follows immediately 
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from the definition. As for transitivity, if A BF
#
 and B CF
#
 then the following 
two mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive cases are to be distinguished: i) 
A F , and ii) A F , B F , C F , | | | |A B  and | | | |B C . In both cases, 
A CF
#
 follows immediately from the definition. Furthermore, F-RIS and F-RSM 
of F
# are also easily seen to follow trivially from the definition. On the other hand, 
( ( ), )#P X F  obviously fails to satisfy F-TE since by definition not A BF#  for any 
A B X,    such that ∅≠ ∈A F  and B F .
It should be emphasized here that the axioms used by Pattanaik and Xu (1990) in 
their well-known, and seminal, characterization of the cardinality-based preorder 
—namely Indifference between Singletons, Strict Monotonicity, and Indepen-
dence— are implied by the corresponding axioms in our list when the reference 
filter F is taken to be the trivial or maximum filter P( )X . Moreover, it is immedia-
tely visible that for F =  P( )X  the fourth axiom of our list i.e. F-Threshold Effect, 
which has no counterpart in the Pattanaik-Xu list, is, in fact, trivially satisfied 
when restricted to the original Pattanaik-Xu domain, which only includes non-
empty opportunity sets. The remarkable flexibility and scope of SIFPs is thereby 
confirmed.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
As mentioned in the Introduction, the characterization of height-based extensions 
of principal filtral opportunity preorders provided in the present paper does not 
extend to the general case of arbitrary filtral opportunity preorders. This is due to 
the fact that when an order filter is not principal, the height function of the corres-
ponding SIFP may exhibit a highly irregular behaviour.
Therefore, the height-based extension of a SIFP does not mimic the behaviour of 
the cardinality-based preorder over the filtral threshold. A simple example may 
help clarify this point.
Example 4. Let X x x= { ,.., }1 7 , Z x x x x x x x= {{ , },{ , , , },{ }}1 2 3 4 5 6 7 , and F F Z= ( )  
(notice that Z  is indeed an antichain of ( ( ), )P X   ). Then, consider the height-
based extension ( ( ), )P X hF  of the F -induced SIFP ( ( ), )P X F  and take A x x x x= { , , , }3 4 5 6 . Clearly, A F . However, h A xF ( { }) = 21  while 
h A xF ( { }) = 57 , hence A x A xhF { } { }7 1  and F-RIS fails.
By contrast, our characterization is, in fact, amenable to a simple generalization 
in another direction. Indeed, a counterpart to Theorem 3 for arbitrary (finite) latti-
ces of sets is readily available provided that the axioms are suitably reformulated 
by replacing join-irreducibles (elements that cover precisely one element) for sin-
gletons/atoms. The details of that extension, however, are best left as a topic for 
future research.
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